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ON FICTIVE SENTENCE ANALYSIS 
by Nils-Lennart Johannesson 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper represents an elaboration of some ideas originally put forth in 
my dissertation (Johannesson 1976, henceforth referred to as 576). There I 
proposed a system of analysis according to which certain sentences with modal 
auxiliaries were regarded as covert realizations of propositions referring to 
fictive worlds. The exposition of the fictive sentence analysis in 576 was appar- 
ently too cursory to be convincing to all readers (see Wigzell1977), and for that 
reason a more detailed discussion may be called for. Further study has also 
shown that the fictive sentence analysis can profitably be extended to sentence 
types that were previously not discussed in terms of fictive worlds. In this way 
we will gain a higher degree of coherence in our analysis of the use of modal 
auxiliaries, besides seeing more clearly how the realisates of various sentence 
types are related to each other. 
I .  FICTIVE WORLDS AND FICTIVE SENTENCES 
When a speaker utters a simple narrative sentence, such as (I),  he uses it to 
describe an event that has taken place in the real world. 
(1) I met Sebastian yesterday. 
The proposition realized by the narrative sentence may be true or false, but 
even if it is false it nevertheless purports to be a description of an event in the 
real world. The speaker can also make a prediction of an event he believes will 
take place in the real world: 
(2) I will meet Sebastian this afternoon. 
(3) When I meet Sebastian, I will remind him of the meeting tonight. 
In (3), the realisate of the first clause characterizes a point oftime subsequent 
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to the speech moment; it does so by referring to an event-the meeting between 
the speaker and Sebastian-in the real world. It presupposes the prediction (2). 
The second clause of (3) is used by the speaker to make a prediction of his own 
actions at the point of time indicated by the first clause. 
If, however, the speaker does not know whether he will meet Sebastian or 
not, he may not want to make any predictions about events in the real world. It 
may nevertheless be the case that he wants to inform the addressee of what his 
own actions will be in case the meeting actually does take place. The speaker can 
then use a FICTIVE SENTENCE: 
(4) If I meet Sebastian, I will remind him of the meeting tonight. 
The proposition realized by the if-clause here serves to characterize a fictive 
world,' i.e., to indicate in what respect the fictive world differs from the 
speaker's idea of the real world. After having established the characteristics of 
the fictive world, the speaker can proceed to speak about events or situations in 
the fictive world; in the case of (4), to make a prediction of his own actions in the 
particular fictive world characterized by his meeting Sebastian. 
It is important to remember that the speaker's prediction pertains only to the 
fictive world he has characterized in the realisate of the if-clause. Only if events 
in the real world develop in such a way as to make the real world correspond 
to the characterization of the fictive world (i.e., if the speaker actually meets 
Sebastian) can the validity of the prediction be attested (if the speaker does 
not remind Sebastian of the meeting, his prediction will have been proven 
invalid). Should the speaker nor meet Sebastian, the question of the validity 
of his prediction will simply not arise. 
Sentences like (4) are called overtfictive sentences, since both the proposi- 
tion that characterizes the fictive world and the proposition that describes1 
predicts an event or situation in the fictive world are given full lexemic reali- 
zation. The following discussion, however, will be confined to sentences that 
can be called covert ficlive sentences? these are sentences whose realisates, 
as we will see, are in some way related to a fictive world. 
2. THE SEMOLOGICAL STRATUM 
In order to see the significance of the proposition clusters postulated for 
the sentences discussed in the following sections of this paper, it is necessary to 
understand the organization of the semological stratum in the model proposed 
here. Although it corresponds closely to that of J76, its main characteristics will 
be restated here for the convenience of readers who are not familiar with that 
work. 
As was suggested in 576, the purpose of the semology is to provide a model of 
how information, acquired through decoding of speech or written text or 
through sensory impressions, can be stored and organized in a speaker's cogni- 
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tive system. The semology will consequently account for semantic as well as 
factors: not only will it explain why a certain proposition is semantic- 
ally well-formed or not, but it will also indicate whether an utterance, the 
of one or more propositions, is appropriate or not in a given speech 
situation. 
The emic units of the lower strata-lexemes, morphemes, phonemes-are 
related to each other (paradigmatically as well as syntagmatically) only by virtue 
of their tactic functions. The basic units of the semological stratum, the concepts 
or sememes, can be related to each other inseveral different ways, all ofwhich 
have to be accounted for in a description of the semology. The relational net- 
work notation customarily used in stratificational grammar is particularly 
useful in semological studies, since it enables us to give a clear and perspicuous 
representation of the complex relations that obtain between sememes; taken 
together, these relations form the sen~ological network. 
A basic sememe is represented in this network as a nection3 (figure 1). The 
upward connections of the nections lead to properties of the sememe, whereas 
the downward connections lead to subtypes or specific instances of the sememe. 
A simple network of semological relationships can be set up on the basis of a 
subcategorization of basic sememes, as shown in figure 2. This diagram ac- 
counts in a simplified way for some of my knowledge about three cats, Mao, 
Cleo, and Helen. Helen, for instance, is represented as having the three proper- 
ties FEMALE, CAT, and GRAY. By virtue of being a cat, Helen can also be seen 
to have the properties FELINE, CARNIVORE, MAMMAL, ANIMAL, etc. 
A hierarchical semological structure of this type is clearly insufficient, how- 
ever, as a representation of all possible relations between sememes. Certain 
properties of sememes, such as the property of carnivores labeled EAT MEAT 
in figure 2, cannot be properly accounted for without the introduction of 
proposilions as part of the semological network. A proposition is a semo- 
logical construction that typically involves an event sememe and one or more 
sememes representing participants in the event. The particular property of 
carnivores mentioned above would be represented as in figure 3; this property 
CAT I .4---- sernerne 
A subtypes, -.---specific instances 
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is in fact only a specialization of a more general property of animals, which is 
also shown (in thin lines) in the diagram. 
Propositions of this type are part of the semotactics; they constitute the rules 
that determine whether a proposition with specific reference is semantically 
well-formed or not. A specific instance of an event is represented by a similar 
construction, but with specific, rather than generic, participants. Figure 4 shows 
a proposition with specific reference that can be realized as the sentence 
(5) Helen ate a herring yesterday. 
This type of proposition can be regarded as a macro-sememe: it is composed 
of several basic sememes, but like the basic sememe shown in figure I ,  it has 
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nection structure, with upward connections to properties of the macro-sememe. 
One typical property of a macro-sememe, shown in figure 4, is its time reference: 
the event is represented as taking place at a particular point (or during a partic- 
ular period) of time that is specified in relation to the speech moment (prior to, 
simultaneous with, or subsequent to the speech moment) or, in addition, in 
terms of some other temporal reference system (year, date, hour, etc.). Another 
potential property of a macro-sememe, indicated by the empty line at@in the 
diagram, is its inclusion as a participant in another macro-sememe. 
The semantic well-formedness of the macro-sememe realized as (5) is shown 
in the diagram by the fact that the sememes that are participants in the specific 
'eating' event are specific instances of the participant categories in the corre- 
sponding semotactic proposition (drawn in thin lines in the diagram). 
For practical purposes it is often unnecessary to show those parts of the 
semological network that form the 'environment' of a certain proposition. If we 
are primarily interested in the internal structure of a macro-sememe, it is very 
convenient to use a simplified form of diagram (figure 5), which does not show 
the positions of the constituent basic sememes in the semological network. It 
must be remembered, however, that this type of diagram, which will be used in 
the remainder of this paper, represents only a small fragment of a much larger 
network. The outer ends of the lines from the macro-sememe must be regarded 
as connected to those points in the total semological network indicated by the 
labels in the diagram. 
The term proposition will be used in the following sections both for semo- 
tactic propositions (figure 3) and for macro-sememes, propositions with 
specific reference and nection structure. No confusion should result from this 
use of the term. Proposition clusters, which will be discussed in the next section, 
are groups of interrelated macro-sememes. The relational network notation is 
particularly useful for showing clearly the degree of their interrelation. For a 
satisfactory account of certain sentences with modal auxiliaries (as well as for 
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many others, not discussed in this paper), it is necessary to associate these 
sentences, not with single propositions, but with proposition clusters. 
3. MELIORATIVE SENTENCES 
In order to show how fictive worlds and proposition clusters are incorpo- 
rated in the semology, I will discuss a meliorative sentence (see J76:83-85) in 
some detail in this section. 
Let us imagine the following situation: John, who is a heavy smoker, says 
to Mary, I wish I could get rid of this terrible cough. After decoding this 
utterance, Mary forms in her semological system the representation of a fictive 
world, W/, which is characterized by John's stopping smoking. In this fictive 
world (unlike the real world), she believes, it is possible that John will get rid 
of his cough; knowing John's obstinacy, however, she regards W/ as merely 
hypothetical. This semological structure would be represented in relational 
network notation as in figure 6. W/ is here represented as a sememe, a property 
of which is specified by the characterizing proposition PROP,,,,. A specific 
instance of 4 is represented by the proposition PROP,. Mary can, if she 
chooses, give this part of her semological network lexemic realization and 
utter the overt fictive sentence: 
(6) If you stopped smoking, you might get rid of that cough. 
IYP 
I / 
JOHN (ad) 
FIG. 6 .  
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But instead of uttering (6), she may keep working within her semological system 
and make a comparison between W / ,  the newly created sememe, and W,, the 
sememe representing the real world, in which John smokes and has a terribIe 
cough. It seems reasonable to assume that she will think that y, if it ever 
came to be real, would be a better world for John than w. A meliorative 
proposition marking W f  as better than U: is incorporated in the semological 
network, and the resultant proposition cluster is shown in figure 7. The latest 
addition to the cluster can be realized, along with PROPch,,. as sentence (7). 
(7) You should stop smoking. 
It should perhaps be pointed out in this connection that such a sentenceas 
(7), in itself, is not an expression of advice. It merely indicates that the speaker 
holds the view that a certain fictive world with certain characteristics would 
somehow (it is not said in what way!) be better than the real world. If John 
says about himseIf, I should stop smoking, or if Peter says about John, He 
should stop smoking, they will have formed identical proposition clusters 
MEL 4 
Y"' 
JOHN (ad) 
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within their cognitive systems, but they are obviously not performing the 
speech act of advising somebody. 
If Mary has determined that ?would be better than U;', however, this may 
cause her to perform the speech act of advising John to stop smoking. The 
proposition cluster will then be extended as shown in figure 8. The speaker 
(Mary) may choose to  realize the relevant parts of this cluster as sentence (8). 
JOHN 
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(8) I advise you to  stop smoking. 
But even after Mary has formed the big proposition cluster of figure 8 in her 
semological system, she may wish to influence John and impart her advice in a 
less conspicuous way than by overtly performing the speech act of advising 
him, i.e., without using a performative verb in her utterance. She can, as a 
matter of fact, still use sentence (7) for this purpose. In other words, the 
speaker is free to  choose which part(s) of a proposition cluster she/ he will give 
lexemic realization. A general principle for the speaker to follow could be 
formulated in this way: Give lexemic realization to as large a part of a proposi- 
tion cluster as enables the addressee to encatalyze as much of the cluster as 
you want him If the speaker does not follow this principle, helshe may 
fail t o  get his message across to  the addressee (unless, of course, the addressee 
can guess what the speaker's intended message was). Now, when John hears 
(6), he will be able to encatalyze the proposition cluster of figure 6. When he 
hears (7), he will be able to  encatalyze the cluster of figure 7, apart from the 
section encIosed by the dotted line, since it has not been mentioned in what 
respect Mf would be better than &.' SimilarIy, upon hearing (8), he will be 
able to  encatalyze the cluster of figure 8 (again, apart  from PROP,). 
It seems reasonable to assume, however, that since a cluster like that of 
figure 7 is so often part of a cluster like that of figure 8 in the speaker's semo- 
logical system, a hearer who is decoding sentence (7) may, after encatalyzing 
the cluster of figure 7, by sheer force of habit incorporate it in a cluster of the 
figure 8 type. For this reason it is possible for a speaker to  use a meliorative 
sentence in order t o  communicate her/his wish to give advice without actually 
performing the speech act of advising. 
4. VOLITION 
In the preceding section no mention was made of the speaker's volition. 
There is nothing in the form of a meliorative sentence to indicate whether the 
speaker personally wants the event represented by the PROP,,,,, to take place 
or not-the speaker can use a meliorative sentence in either case. In 576 a 
distinction was made between subjective meliorative sentences, used when 
the speaker's volition is involved, and objective meliorative sentences, used 
when no volition is involved. Such a distinction is, of course, valid only with 
reference to  the realization of a known proposition cluster. A hearer, decoding 
a meliorative sentence, can conclude only from the character of the event 
represented by the PROP,,,,,, his knowledge of the speaker and the speech situa- 
tion, etc., whether the sentence shall be regarded as subjective o r  objective; 
i.e., whether the speaker's volition is involved o r  not. A meliorative sentence 
can consequently be useful for a speaker who wishes to  avoid giving his 
volition overt expression.6 
O N  FICTIVE SENTENCE ANALYSIS 
agent of object of 
vof~lion 
FIG. 9 
A volitional proposition (figure 9) can occur with a meliorative proposition 
(figure 7) in a proposition cluster. But whereas a meliorative proposition can 
occur in a cluster without a volitional proposition, as we saw in the preceding 
section, the opposite is not true. The reason for this is simply that whenever you 
want a certain event to take place, you will, from your personal point of view, 
regard the fictive world characterized by that event taking place as a better 
world than the real one. 
If a volitional proposition is added to a proposition cluster, the speaker can 
choose to realize different parts of the cluster, and he can also add more com- 
ponents to the cluster, depending on a number of factors: on the relationship 
between speaker and addressee, on the speaker's assumptions concerning the 
addressee's readiness to perform the action, on whether the speaker regards the 
fictive world characterized by the object of volition coming true as hypothetical 
or not, etc. 
I will now go on to discuss the proposition clusters that should be postulated 
for different sentence types expressing the speaker's volition. The list of sentence 
types discussed here is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
If the speaker regards the fictive world characterized by the object of his 
volition coming true as hypothetical, as was the case in the realisates of meliora- 
tive sentences, he can choose to give prominence to his volition, as the following 
examples illustrate: 
(9) a. I wish you would open the window. 
b. I wish the window were open. 
c. I wish you had opened the window. 
Figures 10a and lob correspond to examples (9a) and (9b). If the encircled 
occurrences of 'ssqN' in figure 1Oa are replaced by 'priN,' the resulting net- 
work will represent example (9c). 
An interesting characteristic of this sentence type is that it can be used to 
express the speaker's volition concerning events in the past that never have 
taken place (indicated in the relational network diagram by the fact that the 
modal object proposition is marked [i] as characterizing a hypothetical fictive 
world and having the time reference 'priN,'and [ii] as being false in the real 
R I C E  UNIVERSITY S T U D I E S  
OPEN WINDOW 
world at the speech moment). In such a case the speaker knows that his volition 
will never be satisfied (unless, of course, he is mistaken in his view that the event 
never took place at the time he wished), and for that reason this sentence type 
was called desperative in 576. The choice of this term does not mean, however, 
that the speaker of (9a) and (9b) despairs of the addressee ever opening the 
window, as was assumed by Wigzell (1977: 197); if the time reference of the 
modal object proposition is 'priN' or  'simN,"he speaker believes that that 
proposition is not true at the speech moment, but whatever its time reference, 
it may well come true at a later time. That is, the speaker of (9c) can well believe 
that the addressee will open the window at a later time, but it will then be too late 
for the speaker's volition to be satisfied. In the same way, the speaker of (9a) and 
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(9b) can well believe that it is possible that the addressee will open the window at 
a time later than the speech moment-indeed, he can utter (9a) or (9b) solely 
with the intention of achieving that effect-and in that case the volition of the 
speaker of (9a) will certainly be satisfied, since the time reference of the modal 
object proposition is 'ssqN.' In that case the use of a desperative sentence 
conveys to  the addressee that the speaker regards W f  as hypothetical. But 
marking an event in the future as hypothetical is not the same as claiming that 
it will never take place-it just amounts to indicating that one takes a some- 
what dim view of the likelihood that it will take place. Thus, using a sentence 
such as (9a) in an attempt to make the addressee open the window may sound 
rather petulant, since it gives the addressee the impression that the speaker 
does not really count on his cooperation but regards it as somewhat unlikely 
that he will actually open the window. 
But a speaker who wants a successful response to an utterance in which he 
expresses his volition has several other kinds of expression at his disposal. Let 
us first study the following selection of sentence types: 
(10) I command you to open the window. 
(1 1) I entreat you to open the window, 
(12) Open the window! 
(13) Can you open the window? 
(14) You can open the window now. 
(15) Would you like to  open the window? 
(16) May I ask you to open the window? 
Of these examples, (10) and (1 1) are overt performative sentences, in the utter- 
ance of which the speaker performs the speech acts of commanding and 
entreating, respectively. It was suggested in 576 that commanding and entreat- 
ing should be regarded as subtypes of imposing one's volition on an addressee; 
the difference between them is that a speaker who commands assumes a posi- 
tion of superiority in relation to the addressee, whereas a speaker who entreats 
assumes a position of inferiority in relation to the addressee (576: 142). In choos- 
ing an overt performative sentence, such as (10) or (I I), the speaker has also 
chosen to give overt expression to the authority relationship he assumes 
towards the addressee. An imperative sentence such as (12), on the other hand, 
is neutral with regard to authority relations; it can be used as an expression of 
imposition regardless of whether the position the speaker assumes is one of 
superiority or inferiority. When decoding (12), the addressee has to rely on his 
knowledge of real (as opposed to assumed) authority relations, information 
supplied by voice quality, gestures, and other features in the speech context, in 
order to determine whether the speaker should be supposed to be commanding 
or entreating (or, perhaps, trying to impose his volition from a neutral authority 
position of equality). Since the imperative is a verb form that is typically used as 
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a substitute for overt performative verbs of the 'imposition' type (command, 
order, beg, implore, entreat, etc.), (12) must, like (10) and (1 I), be regarded as an 
overt expression of imposition. 
If the speaker for some reason wishes to tone down his imposition and thus 
make it more palatable to the addressee, he can choose to express his volition by 
means of one of the sentence types (13)-(16) (or a similar, equivalent construc- 
tion). Sentences of these types are not overtly marked as expressions of imposi- 
tion, yet it is a well-known fact that they are conventionally used as such. Searle 
(I975:73-74) gives a detailed account of how an addressee would go about 
interpreting a sentence of the same type as (13)-Can you pass the salt?- 
uttered in a specific situation (at a dinner table) as an expression of the speaker's 
volition. Figure 1 1  shows the proposition cluster that is the realisate of (13), 
provided that the sentence is intended as a request by the speaker. A speaker 
N 
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makes a request if he believes it is possible for the addressee to perform 
the action that satisfies the speaker's volition, and consequently the pass, propo- 
sition is incorporated in the c l u ~ t e r . ~  As Searle points out (1975:69), it is 
possible to use, and to interpret, sentences such as (13)-(16) as if they conveyed 
only their literal meaning. In such a case, the realisate of (13) would be only 
the part of the cluster in figure 11 that is drawn in thick lines. In either case, this 
is the part of the cluster that is given lexemic realization by the speaker as (13). 
The question form is typically used when the speaker does not take it for granted 
that the addressee is expecting to be asked to perform the action represented by 
the modal object proposition; the speaker is intruding, as it were, in the ad- 
dressee's doings, and indicates his awareness of this fact by his use of the 
question form. 
In this respect there is a difference between the (otherwise identical) realisates 
of (13) and (14). The speaker will conventionally realize the POSS~ proposition of 
a cluster such as that in figure 1 I as a statement only in the following two 
cases: 
i) The speaker believes (or he wants to give the impression, by his use of 
this sentence type, that he believes) that theaddressee is willing, and prepared, 
to perform the action represented by the modal object proposition. The speaker 
further believes (or wants to give the impression that he believes) that the 
addressee is expecting him to utter a type (14) sentence, and that the utterance of 
the type (14) sentence will 'trigger off the proper action by the addressee. The 
sentence typically contains the adverb now in this case. 
ii) The speaker believes (or wants to give the impression, by his use of this 
sentence type, that he believes) that the addressee is prepared to do whatever 
the speaker requests in order to satisfy the speaker's volition. This may be the 
case if the speaker is addressing an employee, or if the addressee has just 
expressed his/ her willingness to assist the speaker. Thus, if Mary says, Can 1 
do an-ything to help you?8 to John, who is painting the kitchen ceiling and 
beginning to feel slightly nauseated by the fumes of the paint, he will utter 
(17), without the adverb now, rather than (13). 
(17) You can open the window, 
(18) a. Can you tell Mr. Ryder to come in, Miss Hadley? 
b. You can tell Mr. Ryder to  come in, Miss Hadley. 
c. You can tell Mr. Ryder to come in now, Miss Hadley. 
Example (18) illustrates a situation when the speaker can have a free choice 
between the different types of can-sentence discussed above. The three 
sentences (18a)-(18c) could all be uttered by a business tycoon to his secretary. 
By using (18a), he will indicate his awareness of the fact that his request is an 
intrusion into the work with which Miss Hadley is occupied at the moment; 
by using (Igb), he will indicate that he takes it for granted that Miss Hadley, as 
his secretary, will be at his beck and call, always prepared to  do  whatever 
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office work he requests; by using ( I  8c), finally, he will indicate that he takes it 
for granted that Miss Hadleyis prepared to perform the action represented by 
the modal object proposition. 
In the realisate of (14) a new proposition, representing the preparedness of 
the addressee to perform the action referred to by the modal object proposition, 
has been added to the proposition cluster of figure I 1. This proposition is shown 
at@in figure 12. The realisate of sentence (17) differs from that of sentence (14) 
only in the scope of the addressee's preparedness, which is shown by the dif- 
ferent position of the preparedness proposition in the semoIogical network of 
figure 13. 
A speaker who utters sentence (15) may, or may not, take it for granted that 
the addressee is prepared to do whatever he requests; there is no way to tell this 
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from his choice of expression. He typically uses a type (1 5) sentence if he regards 
his request as so reasonable that he is sure the addressee will be willing to satisfy 
his volition. But the speaker does not express this directly. Instead, he super- 
ficially asks the addressee whether he would defer to the speaker's volition9 in a 
hypothetical fictive world ( W, in figure 14) with unspecified characteristics 
(Would you be willing to open the window, e.g., if I were to ask you?), being 
confident that the addressee will interpret his utterance as an imposition 
sentence along the lines suggested in Searle (1975). The realisate of sentence 
(15) is shown in figure 14. The proposition cluster is by now fairly complex, 
but only those parts of the cluster drawn in thick lines in the diagram will be 
given lexemic realization as a question. 
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When a speaker uses a sentence such as (16)-a hedged performative 
sentencelo-as an imposition sentence, he goes even further in his endeavors 
to detach himself, by means of his choice of expression, from the imposition 
of his volition. If the sentence is interpreted literally, the speaker does no more 
than ask the addressee to grant him permission to  perform a certain speech act 
(asking), which in its turn will involve the speaker's imposing his volition on 
the addressee. But in a normal speech situation, this will count as performing 
the speech act (Fraser 1975: 188), and ( 1  6) can consequently be used as apolite 
imposition sentence-for instance, when addressing a stranger in a train 
compartment. The realisate of sentence (16) is shown in figure 15. The dotted 
parts of this diagram represent the proposition that serves to  hedge the 
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performative; it is realized as Maj, I .  . . ?. Those parts of the cluster that are 
also given lexemic realization are, as usual, drawn in thick lines. 
5. ETHICAL FICTIVE SENTENCES 
The category of ethi~al~f ic t ive  sentences was first discussed in J76:86-90. 
Further study of the applicability of fictive sentence analysis has shown, how- 
ever, that that category was too comprehensive and included sentence types 
that should properly be anaIyzed separately (although still in terms of 
fictive worlds). Some of these sentences have been discussed in the preceding 
section, e.g., (18), and others will be taken up in section 6 below. 
The term 'ethical fictive sentence' will be retained here for that  setltence 
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type to which it was originally applied: sentences by means of which the speaker 
evokes a fictive world characterized by a proposition referring to an action that 
is evaluated as 'right' or 'wrong' in a code of ethics or a rule system. Examples of 
this sentence type are: 
(19) You can't move a pawn backwards. 
(20) You can't call Stinky graceful. 
(21) You can? go on being rude to people. 
(22) I couldn't do that to an old friend. 
Obviously, it is physically possible to move a pawn backwards, but such a move- 
ment violates the rules of the game. In the same way, it is possible to call even 
the clumsiest person graceful, but only at the cost of violating the conventions 
(rules) governing the applicability of that term in English. In the case of (21) and 
(22), finally, an unspecified ethical code is invoked. 
The proposition cluster that forms the realisate of an ethical fictive sentence 
typically includes a meliorative proposition, but in this case the speaker regards 
the real world ( as better than the fictive world ( Hf) that is characterized by 
the addressee's (or some other person) doing something that is 'wrong.' Figure 
16 shows the proposition cluster associated with sentence (19)"; only those 
parts drawn in thick lines are given lexemic realization. 
Ethical fictive sentences can also appear as questions, used by the speaker 
to inquire whether a certain action would be 'wrong,'to inquire why a certain 
action is 'wrong,' or to inquire why the addressee (or some other person) 
performs an action that is 'wrong': 
(23) Can I wear this tie at the reception? 
(24) Can I move the king to this square? 
(25) Why can't I move the king to this square? 
(26) How can you call Stinky graceful? 
(27) How can you be so cruel? 
6. JUSTIFIABLE ATTITUDES 
A sentence category that should also be analyzed in terms of fictive worlds 
is one that was first discussed by Larkin (1969), who, however, was forced to 
admit that the underlying nature of these sentences remained "a mystery." 
The examples given by Larkin were the following (his numbers la-Ic): 
(28) You can anticipate more conspiracy indictments in the near future. 
(29) We can look forward to fewer fluctuations in the market in the months 
ahead. 
(30) Peter can expect to receive an important promotion before Wednesday. 
Other examples that should be considered in connection with these are: 
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(31) You can forget about that extra money. 
(32) You can consider yourself lucky. 
(33) We can assume that his story is true. 
(34) You can be pretty sure that the money comes from your pocket. 
(35) We can take it for granted that he will agree. 
(36) We can disregard Major Wylde's objections. 
(37) You can abandon the idea of a vacation in Jamaica this year. 
(38) We can give up all thoughts of a settlement out of court. 
(39) We can conclude that Mozart did not like the flute. 
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The list of examples is fairly long, and it could easily be made even longer. Yet it 
should be obvious by now what all these examples have in common: the predi- 
cate refers to a mental attitude, and by his use of can in the sentence the speaker 
indicates that there are reasonsjustifying the adoption of this mental attitude. 
The following example may help to illuminate this function of can: 
(40) a. I consider myself lucky. 
b. I can consider myself lucky. 
Both (40a) and (40b) could be uttered by a car driver who has escaped from 
a serious accident with only a couple of broken ribs and a mild concussion. If 
he uses (40a), he merely states as a fact that he adopts a certain mental attitude 
towards his situation (i.e., considers himself lucky). If he uses(40b), however, 
he indicates that there are reasons (e,g., the fact that he survived theaccident) 
to justify his adoption of that attitude towards his situation. 
In the proposition cluster associated with a sentence of this type there will 
typically be a meliorative proposition: a fictive world, characterized by the 
addressee adopting the mental attitude that the speaker thinks isjustifiable, is 
regarded by the speaker as better than the real world. Figure 17 shows the 
realisate of sentence (32); those parts of the proposition cluster drawn in thick 
lines will be given Iexemic realization. 
7. S U M M A R Y  
In this paper I have attempted to outline how certain sentences with modal 
auxiliaries can be analyzed in terms of fictive worlds, and how such an  
analysis helps us to perceive similarities between the realisates of different 
sentences. Furthermore, the introduction of the notions of fictive worlds and 
proposition clusters greatly enhances the possibilities of the semology to 
account for pragmatic as well as semantic phenomena; i.e., to account for the 
way speakers actually use sentences to convey their ideas to their interlocutors. 
A description using proposition clusters, only parts of which need to be given 
lexemic realization in order to enabIe the addressee to encatalyze the whole (or 
nearly the whole) cluster, turns out to be particularly useful for the many dif- 
ferent sentence types by means of which the speaker seeks to impose his volition 
on the addressee, as was shown in section 4 above. 
The discussion of the use of modal auxiliaries here should in no way be 
regarded as complete. In a short paper like this it is necessary to concentrate on 
a few illuminating cases, while a great number of other sentence types have to be 
left out of consideration. Even the discussion of those sentence types dealt with 
here is far from complete. Apart from a discussion of the proposition clusters in 
the realisates, a complete account of modal auxiliary sentences should include a 
set of encoding rules for the realization of particular propositions by the speaker 
and a set of decoding principles for the hearer, by means of which he will be able 
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to encatalyze the proper proposition clusters in his semological network. It is 
also important to consider other sentence types that can be used as alternative 
realizations of these proposition clusters. I am convinced, however, that a study 
of sentence realisates using terms of fictive worlds and proposition clusters as 
outlined in this paper could provide a suitable basis for such a full-scale investi- 
gation. 
NOTES 
Abbreviations used in the sernological network d~agrams: 
ad addressee 
CAU cause 
DEF deference 
F false 
HYP hypothetical 
MEL rnel~orative, 'better than' 
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N 
POSS, 
POSS. 
PREP 
pri 
PROP 
PROP, /,or 
SAT 
sim 
SP 
ssq 
VOL 
speech moment, 'now' 
physical possibility 
theoretical possibility, degree of likelihood 
prepared(ness) 
prior to 
proposition 
proposition characterizing a fictive world 
satisfy 
simultaneous with 
speaker 
subsequent to 
volition 
fictive worlds 
the real world 
1. A more common term ispossible n~orld, but since the real world is one of many possible 
worlds, I prefer the termfictive world in order t o  emphasize the contrast between the real world 
and the fictive world. Similarly I use the termficrrve senrence instead of the customary condirional 
senrence, partly t o  indicate that this sentence type is associated with fictive worlds, partly t o  
emphasize the affinities between the overt and the covert fictive sentences. The latter form a 
superficially heterogeneous category and are traditionally not described asconditional sentences. 
2. For a brief discussion of conditional sentences, i.e., overt fictive sentences, in these terms, 
see J76:72-8 1 .  
3. For a more detailed presentation of nections, see Lamb (1966:50); for a discussion of the 
representation of sememes as macro-nections, see J76:132. 
4. This principle corresponds closely to Grice's (1975:45) first maxim of Quantity, "Make 
your contribution a s  informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)." 
5. In a case such as this, however, when the relevant proposition has just been given overt 
realization by the addressee,it iseasy for him to infer in what respect WI would be better than W,. 
In other situations this may be much more difficult. 
6. Other possible components of a proposition cluster realized as a meliorativesentence can 
be, besides the speaker's volition, representations of unfulfilled duty, unremedied social wrongs, 
etc. These points fall outside the scope of this paper, but they should, of course, be taken into 
consideration in a more complete account of meliorative sentences. 
7. POSSI, whlch represents physical possibility, should be distinguished from ~ o s s l ,  which 
represents the speaker's estimate of the likel~hood that an event will take dace.  See J76:127-129. 
If a speaker makes a request although he believes that it is not possible for the addressee to  
perform the action, he is likely to  have some ulterior motive with his request, such as wishing to 
humiliate the addressee by exposing his inability. 
8. The analysis of this use of a question with can as a means of indicating willingness fails 
outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion of a similar use of statements with can, see 
57639. 
9. For an analysis of willingness and permission as subtypes of deference to (real or antici- 
pated) volition, see J76:38-41. 
10. For this term, and for a discussion of other types of hedged performatives, see Fraser 
(1975). 
1 1. This diagram differs somewhat from the corresponding diagram, figure4:40, in 576157, 
as a consequence of the developments of the fictive sentence analysis. 
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